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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the distribution of power within financial networks of investment banks 
in equity capital markets (ECMs) of three key economies in Asia—Hong Kong, Japan, and 
Singapore. Using social network analysis, it shows that while bulge-bracket banks occupy 
core positions in all three locations, their dominance is challenged by emerging Asian 
investment banks. The ECM networks of investment banks are strongly shaped by 
development trajectory and regional contexts of specific IFCs, which reveals the 
differentiated nature of finance across Asia. Results also highlight the need for further 
research on networks within financial centres in addition to inter-city networks to understand 
the roles and development of IFCs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The agglomeration of financial activities in international financial centers (IFCs) and global 
city networks have been a key feature of geographical research on global economic flows and 
key nodes in global finance (Sassen, 2001; Taylor & Derudder, 2016). Studies on world city 
networks utilise sophisticated analyses of interlocking advanced business services (ABS) firm 
networks, to determine the positionality and status of cities within transnational networks, 
which in turn shape their roles and trajectories. The network positions of cities are calculated 
based on firm size and functions (such as headquarters, regional headquarters, branches or 
subsidiaries, number of employees) to determine the power of cities in the world economy.	
This approach, however, focuses on the connections between cities rather than the processes 
and relationships operating within those cities in shaping their power and positions. We argue 
for the need to understand the roles and importance of IFCs in terms of actual processes and 
relationships operating within those cites in order to develop a more grounded and 
substantive understanding of IFCs as strategic places for different types of financial firms 
(Taylor et al., 2014).   
In this paper, we examine whether the distribution of power within financial networks 
follow similar or distinct patterns. Our focus on this question is motivated by the observation 
that, should the distribution of power vary between IFCs, understanding the causes of such 
variation would contribute to the knowledge of changing roles and capacities of IFCs in terms 
of local development and regional dynamics, and not just in terms of their positions in inter-
city networks (c.f. Taylor & Derudder, 2016). Furthermore, according to existing research in 
financial geography, economic sociology, and varieties of capitalism literatures (Brenner et 
al., 2010; Dixon, 2011; Streeck & Thelen, 2005), we should find distinct patterns of power 
distribution—patterns that reflect developmental trajectories and regional geographies, and 
patterns that highlight the territorial dimensions of seemingly global financial networks (Coe 
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et al. 2014). We examine this hypothesis by focusing on financial networks of investment 
banks in equity capital markets (ECMs) of three prominent IFCs in Asia—Hong Kong, 
Japan, and Singapore.1 Studies on world cities have noted a discernible shift from west to east 
over the past two decades, in terms of increasing network connectivity of key cities from 
emerging economies, especially China (Derudder & Taylor, 2016; Pan et al., 2018). The 
rising importance of Asia in global financial networks is also noted by Wojcik et al. (2018) in 
terms of the growth of Japanese and Chinese investment banks amidst the overall shrinkage 
of  investment banking activities after the 2008 global financial crisis. Our study of financial 
networks within these three prominent IFCs in Asia therefore extends those preliminary 
observations with a richer account that further develops our understanding of the geographies 
of finance in Asia. We analyse the networks of investment banks as they play important roles 
in shaping financial flows and connecting key actors in global capital markets (Wojcik et al., 
2018). 
 If trajectories of local development and regional context matter in shaping financial 
activities, we should find significant differences in the positions and power of different types 
of investment banks, in particular the highly global bulge-bracket investment banks that 
dominate international finance. We operationalise this argument by using social network 
analysis (SNA) to examine the power of social actors through the patterns of relations they 
form (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Within SNA, we employ a cutting-edge technique called 
cohesive blocking (Moody & White, 2003), which enables us to identify the power of 
particular investment banks within financial networks. 
Studies on investment banks tend to focus on their firm size (e.g., firm capitalisation, 
number of employees), business value (e.g., size and value of deals, fees and revenue 
																																								 																				
1 ECM transaction data from Dealogic are collected at the national level rather than city level. Given that Tokyo 
dominates ECM activities in Japan, this is still a reasonable proxy for examining the relative power and 
characteristics of Hong Kong, Singapore and Tokyo as financial centres.  
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generated), and international reach (e.g., locations of regional headquarters and branches). 
However, from a sociological perspective, these measures do not sufficiently capture the 
nature of relationships between investment banks and the different positions of power within 
the industry. The key to measuring the power of investment banks in a network lies in 
ranking different banks based on how resilient they are to the removal of other banks with 
whom they transact. The firms that are more resilient to the removal of their partners are 
embedded more deeply in a financial network, since resilience is possible only by forming 
relations with multiple other firms. Higher embeddedness, in turn, implies a greater degree of 
power. This follows from two complementary definitions of power in sociology. First, 
drawing from the Weberian definition of power (Weber 1978, pp. 53-54), Organisation A that 
has access to a greater number relations compared to Organisation B has greater control over 
information and resource flows compared to B. Second, following Emerson’s theory of 
power-dependence relations (Cook & Emerson, 1984; Emerson, 1962), Organisation A’s 
power over Organisation B increases proportionally with the number of alternative relations 
that provide similar means for achieving A’s goals. 
Hence, the more deeply embedded a financial organisation is in the network, the more 
central and powerful that organisation is within that industry (Moody & White, 2003; Uzzi, 
1999). At the extreme, we find core-periphery networks. Such financial networks are 
dominated by a handful of banks that appear as a ‘core’ with dense ties among each other, 
while peripheral actors feature sparse connections among each other. As a result, peripheral 
actors have to rely on the core group for access to resources and deals (Borgatti & Everett, 
2000; Mani & Moody, 2014). Hence, the greater the contrast between central and peripheral 
groups in a financial network, the more central groups dominate that particular industry. 
Social networks in the real world rarely exhibit clear core-periphery patterns. Instead, one 
finds networks formed by multiple ‘layers’ that are differentially embedded. As we explain 
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below, cohesive blocking is an indispensable tool to uncover the different layers of 
embeddedness in a network. 
In line with the argument outlined above, we expect the historical development and 
regional context of a particular IFC to influence the positions of different investment banks 
(bulge-bracket, middle-market, and boutique, as discussed below). The historical 
development of the banking sector and regional context of finance in Hong Kong, Singapore, 
and Japan show considerable variation. In Hong Kong, we find a truly international finance 
sector that historically placed few limits on the activities of foreign financial intermediaries. 
However, greater integration of Hong Kong with Chinese financial markets since the early 
1990s has resulted in a heterogenous and highly competitive market. In Singapore, we find a 
relatively smaller regional hub, albeit one where domestic banks—purposefully nurtured by 
the state—have become competitors to global firms. Japan offers a strong contrast to both 
Hong Kong and Singapore, as the Japanese banking and finance industry is highly 
consolidated and presents formidable barriers to entry for foreign institutions. As such, we 
expect the position of different types of investment banks to reflect these factors.  
Thus, we offer a structural analysis on the power of investment banks, which explains 
network positions through developmental trajectories and regional context. We complement 
the structural analysis of large financial networks with insights from 50 interviews conducted 
with investment bankers in Singapore, Hong Kong, mainland China and Japan.2 Although our 
understanding of the industry and the geographical contexts of key Asian financial centres are 
informed by these interviews, the evidence presented in this paper focuses on quantitative 
structural analysis in order to investigate the power of investment banks, as indicated by the 
embeddedness of investment banks within such networks.  
																																								 																				
2 Majority of the 50 interviews were conducted face-to-face, with four interviews conducted over telephone, and 
lasted between 30 to 60 minutes. Respondents range from associates and directors to regional managers and 
country heads. Interviews in mainland China were conducted in Mandarin while the rest were in English.  
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This research design enables us to address several gaps in the existing literature on 
investment banking and IFCs. Within the geography literature, research on investment 
banking has largely focused on working practices (Jones, 2003; Hall, 2007), elite workers 
(Cook et al., 2007), and intersections with financial crises (Christophers, 2009; Wójcik et al., 
2017). Both the relationships amongst investment banks themselves and how their locations 
in key financial centres result in particular industry configurations remain poorly understood. 
Existing studies focus on headquarter functions and branch locations rather than transactional 
relationships and the distribution of power within such networks (Leyshon et al., 2008; 
Taylor & Derudder, 2016; Yeung et al., 2017). The literature on IFCs mirrors this lacuna, as 
it focuses on IFCs as centres of command and control in the organisation of the world 
economy as well as major sites of production for finance and specialised services (Sassen, 
2001; Cassis & Wojcik, 2018). Research on IFCs draws upon a network approach in terms of 
how flows of information, labour, and capital between IFCs shape the overall global financial 
architecture (Faulconbridge, 2004; Lai, 2012; Wojcik, 2013). The agglomeration of financial 
activities in IFCs and the nature of inter-city networks have been well-documented (Sassen, 
2001; Cook et al., 2007; Taylor et al., 2014; Bassens & van Meeteren, 2015; Taylor & 
Derudder, 2016). However, there is limited research on the structure of financial networks 
within these cities, what that might reveal about those IFCs as strategic places for specific 
types of financial firms, and whether such financial networks signal opportunities or 
limitations for IFC development. 
In economic sociology and organisational studies, there is also limited research on the 
social structure of the finance industry and the distribution of power among financial 
intermediaries. Although one of the fundamental objectives of new economic sociology has 
been to understand how networks coordinate economic activities (Powell, 1990) and how 
power plays a fundamental role in shaping organizational networks (Cook & Emerson, 1984), 
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there are few such studies on financial networks (Chuluun, 2015; Pollock et al., 2004; 
Shipilov, 2006). Given the importance of relationships in shaping business practices and 
industry structure, particularly in a crucial segment like investment banking, this is an 
important lacuna.  
Accordingly, we make several contributions to the existing literature. First, our 
arguments on the relationship between developmental trajectories, regional context, and 
network position of different investment banks connect the literatures on IFCs and financial 
geography to economic sociology and social network analysis. Second, we probe into a new 
and potentially fruitful line of inquiry, one that investigates how path-dependent institutional 
and geographical factors shape networks within IFCs. Third, our findings on different power 
configurations in leading Asian financial centres provide important evidence that substantiate 
initial observations of increasingly important Asian cities in global financial networks 
(Derudder & Taylor, 2016; Pan et al., 2018; Wojcik et al., 2018).  
 
DEVELOPMENTAL TRAJECTORIES AND REGIONAL CONTEXT 
Although banking has long been important to Singapore’s development as a trading hub, 
sophisticated investment banking activities grew significantly only in recent decades. The 
early history of banking was dominated by smaller family-owned banks that mostly 
conducted deposit-taking and trade financing for domestic and trade activities, although 
larger foreign banks were present due to colonial trading interests. After independence in 
1965,  there was concerted government effort to attract financial institutions for developing 
new financial markets and products (Woo, 2016). The establishment of the Asian Dollar 
Market in 1968 was a milestone, and 1970s through to 1980s saw steady entry of investment 
banks from the UK, USA, Canada and Germany. The next milestone came during banking 
liberalisation in 1999-2004, known as the Singapore ‘Big Bang’. Liberalisation measures 
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included a new category of Qualifying Full Bank (QFB) licenses to foreign banks, increasing 
the number of restricted banks, giving offshore banks greater flexibility in Singapore Dollar 
wholesale business and lifting foreign shareholding limit in local banks. All these created 
competitive pressures on local banks and led to the consolidation of numerous local banks 
into three larger entities (DBS, UOB and OCBC) (Lai & Daniels, 2017). After mergers and 
business restructuring, the enlarged local banks shifted from traditional loan intermediation 
into capital markets services and expanded into the Asian regional markets. At the same time, 
the banking liberalisation enabled foreign investment banks to increase their product 
offerings and capabilities in Singapore and created a substantive investment banking sector. 
While the small domestic market offers limited opportunities, the regional Southeast Asian 
market (and the Chinese market to some extent) present significant opportunities as firms in 
the growing economies of Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, India and Vietnam seek M&A, 
equity and debt solutions.  
Hong Kong’s transformation from a small entrepot to an eminent financial centre is 
largely attributed to the openness of the former British colony and the full convertibility of its 
currency (Jao, 1997; Schenk, 2002). These two factors also led to a much more liberalised 
banking environment, in which local and foreign banks could operate freely in terms of 
identifying suitable types of banking products and niche markets that best suit their 
capabilities and business strategies. Although a three-tier bank licensing system was 
introduced in 1990 to improve systemic stability, the early presence of many foreign banks 
and their historical networks meant that most of them continued to operate at the top tier of 
‘Licensed Banks’ (with full range of banking activities). After the 1997 handover, the ‘One 
country, two systems’ principle allowed the Hong Kong dollar to continue circulating as a 
convertible and separate currency and enabled Hong Kong to serve as a vital gateway for 
capital flows in and out of China (Meyer, 2000; Jao, 1997). The deep capital markets in Hong 
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Kong, strong legal environment and regulatory framework, and access to a wide pool of 
investors through the global networks of investment banks made it particularly attractive for 
mainland Chinese companies seeking IPOs and secondary listings (Lai, 2012). However, the 
preference for local Hong Kong or Chinese investment banks (or securities firms) is also due 
to language, familiarity with business cultures, and mainland regulatory requirements. There 
is therefore a more diverse range of industry players, with bulge-bracket banks, large 
established Hong Kong banks and Chinese securities firms appealing to different types of 
firms and equity issues.  
The post-war development of Japan’s financial markets was characterised by the 
strong role of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) through three aspects of Japanese political 
economy (Hori, 2005). First, there was close cooperation between the ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) and MOF since 1955. Second, prominent Japanese banks exercised 
relationship banking through cross-shareholding and long-term commitment to major firms 
(Arikawa & Miyajima, 2007; Vogel, 2006). Third, competition in many industries, including 
finance, was ‘managed’ to promote efficiency, cooperation, and commitment to economic 
development. The Japanese financial industry in the 1980s was segmented into city banks, 
trust banks, regional banks, Shinkin banks, and credit cooperatives (Park, 2012). By the late 
1990s, the cooperative relationship between LDP and MOF broke down following prolonged 
deleveraging in the private sector and a series of financial intermediary failures (Hori, 2005). 
The 1997 Asian financial crisis then precipitated a wave of reforms known as the Japanese 
financial ‘Big Bang’ (Toya, 2006), which led to a wave of bank mergers. As a result, 
Japanese mega-banks (in particular Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, Mizuho Financial 
Group, and Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group) command an overwhelming share of the 
Japanese capital markets, with dominant positions in corporate finance in addition to 
comprehensive domestic branch networks. High saving rates further increase the financial 
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power of Japanese mega-banks since they capture the lion’s share of private and corporate 
deposits through their commercial branch networks. The highly consolidated banking 
industry makes Japan a difficult place for foreign financial institutions. The biggest challenge 
for foreign banks is their lack of distribution networks within the highly consolidated banking 
landscape in Japan.  
Given the above observations, we expect Japan to exhibit the greatest degree of power 
concentration, followed by Hong Kong and Singapore. This is because Japanese mega-banks 
command an overwhelming share of the Japanese capital markets with dominant positions in 
corporate finance (Arikawa & Miyajima, 2007; Vogel, 2006). Moreover, Japan is a net 
source of capital but not a regional conduit or recipient of finance capital, which limits the 
role of foreign investment banks as intermediaries (Stowell, 2012). The ECM landscape in 
Japan, therefore, presents opportunities for only the largest bulge-bracket firms who could 
leverage on their global distribution networks to connect Japanese clients with international 
investors. In contrast, Hong Kong is a highly liberal IFC with little historical differentiation 
between local and foreign banks. Its role as a gateway for capital flows into (and later on, out 
of) China present significant opportunities for various financial intermediaries (Jao, 1997; 
Meyer, 2000), such as bulge-bracket banks, large established Hong Kong banks and Chinese 
securities firms appealing to different types of firms and equity issues (Lai, 2012). Compared 
to Hong Kong, we expect Singapore ECM network to be less diverse and dominated by a 
smaller number of bulge-bracket and regional banks. This is due to the small domestic ECM 
market coupled with emerging opportunities in the regional Southeast Asian market. 
 
EQUITY CAPITAL MARKETS AND INVESTMENT BANK NETWORKS 
Investment banks provide advice and management services for complex financial transactions 
and capital creation for corporations, organisations, and governments. Two main activities are 
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underwriting (for debt financing and issuance of equity securities) and mergers and 
acquisition (M&A). Investment banks are generally categorised into bulge-bracket, middle-
market and boutique firms (Bruce & Foerster, 2013). In general, bulge-bracket banks are 
industry leaders whether in terms of deal value, firm size, and global networks. The likes of 
Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and Credit Suisse work on the largest deals from 
transnational corporations and have the most recognised names in the investment banking 
world.3 Middle-market banks work on smaller deals with more regional focus (e.g., North 
American or Asian activities and client networks) or industry specialisation (e.g., agri-food or 
energy). Boutique investment banks have fewer employees with localised presence and tend 
to specialise in specific segments (such as M&A) or industries (e.g., healthcare).4 
During an IPO or other equity issuance, one or a group of investment banks act as 
underwriters to handle documentation and reporting requirements, liaise with potential 
investors to market the offering and gauge interest, and offer guarantee to purchase a 
minimum number of securities themselves. A bookrunner or lead manager is the main 
underwriter who coordinates the information and workflow of other underwriters and 
advanced business services (ABS) firms (e.g., law, accounting, and consultancy firms), and 
determine how the new issue would be divided among all underwriters. Our focus is on the 
roles and positions of investment banks in these ECM networks, particularly those who act as 
bookrunners or lead managers, as these are positions of power in shaping various aspects of 
the ECM deal, such as the appointment of other underwriters and ABS firms, proportion of 
fees allocated to different underwriters, deal structure, and marketing strategies. 
 
																																								 																				
3 In this paper, we identify the top 10 bulge-bracket banks as commonly used by industry participants (from 
interviews and industry websites); namely J.P. Morgan, Goldman Sachs, Citi, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, 
Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Bank, Barclays, Credit Suisse, UBS and HSBC. 
4 There is a small group of elite boutique banks with substantive international network and strong reputations 
comparable to bulge-bracket banks.  
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METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
We utilise a commercial dataset on ECM transactions provided by Dealogic, one of the 
industry leaders in financial data services. In our analysis, we focus on three categories of 
transactions: IPO, follow-on (FO) issues, and debt instruments convertible to shares, for a 
three-year period between 2013-2015.5 In these transactions, we examine relationships built 
through underwriting activities by focusing on the most prominent roles that involve 
substantial interaction between investment banks: bookrunner, lead manager and global co-
ordinator. We include all the transactions whose target market is Japan, Hong Kong or 
Singapore, regardless of the nationality of the firm, as transactions with investment banks, 
ABS firms, and regulators are conducted locally. Thus, the bookrunner for an American firm 
listing in Singapore Exchange is included in our analysis. We also include all transactions 
involving a firm already listed in a particular financial centre, since such transactions are 
highly likely to involve banks operating in that financial centre, regardless of the target 
market for the transaction. Following standard procedures in SNA, we build our relational 
dataset from the raw financial data pertaining to transactions (see Appendix). 
 The cohesive-blocking technique ranks social groups—blocks in the SNA 
terminology—in a network by social solidarity, measured by the degree of group cohesion 
(Moody & White, 2003). For instance, in a group of 10 connected actors, if the group they 
form remains connected after the removal of any 3 actors but becomes disconnected with the 
removal of 4 actors, that indicates a level of social solidarity of 4. The higher this number is, 
the higher is the level of social solidarity. Empirical research in SNA shows that social 
groups are often nested in a group with a higher degree of social cohesion, which can be 
found by examining whether a group with higher degree of cohesion exists after removing the 
																																								 																				
5 This follows standard procedures in SNA and prevents unusual results from any particularly large equity issue 
in a single year (Chuluun, 2015). For robustness checks, we have also conducted the analysis for 2- and 4-year 
periods, which confirmed our key findings. 
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actors that disconnect the social group (Moody & White, 2003). As weakly connected actors 
are removed from a group, nested social groups with higher degree of cohesion emerge. 
Accordingly, groups with lower degree of cohesion are embedded in groups with higher 
degree of cohesion (Granovetter, 1985). Thus, one can assign an embeddedness score to 
particular groups in a social network.6 Moody & White (2003) provide strong evidence that 
the embeddedness score is a good predictor of subjective relations (e.g., attachment) as well 
as behavioural patterns (e.g., political contributions). Furthermore, embeddedness revealed 
through cohesive blocking analysis is also aligned with another key notion in SNA — 
centrality — which measures prominence in a network. Groups and actors embedded at 
deeper levels occupy key positions in the social network. Because the cohesive blocking 
technique is not sensitive to the weight of ties (i.e., transaction value in ECM networks), we 
supplement our analysis with weighted betweenness centrality measures, which capture the 
extent to which an underwriter might occupy a bridging position between pairs of other 
underwriters. When weighted by deal value, investment banks with a high betweenness 
centrality score enjoy a structural advantage as their network positions provide opportunities 
for acting as intermediary or gatekeeper (Freeman, 1978). 
In addition to cohesive blocking analysis, our comparison of different investment 
banking networks relies on two additional SNA measures: density and transitivity. Density is 
the proportion of actual ties to all possible ties (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Transitivity, or 
clustering coefficient, is an indicator of the ‘cliquishness’ of a network (Watts & Strogatz, 
1998); it captures the degree to which nodes in a network cluster together.7 A high clustering 
coefficient combined with centrality in a dense financial network indicates that bookrunners 
at the centre of the network are likely to form groups where they have a high number of 
																																								 																				
6 Please see Appendix for more detailed explanation. 
7 We use the ratio of closed triples to connected triples as the measure of clustering coefficient (Csárdi & 
Nepusz, 2006; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). 
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mutual connections among each other, which increases the power gap between such a group 
and the rest of the bookrunners outside that group. 
We present our results with a novel visualisation algorithm (Gemici & Vashevko, 
2018). We first show the group that is at the lowest level of social cohesion as a square. Then 
we find the group with higher cohesion nested within this group. We show this nested group 
as a square nested within the parent group. The region between two squares contains firms 
that are connected to the parent group but become disconnected from the child group with 
higher degree of social cohesion. We repeat this process until we reach the core of the 
network, where we find the group with the highest degree of social cohesion. This technique 
reveals which groups are at the centre or periphery of a financial network, and which 
bookrunners are more deeply embedded. In each figure, the numbers associated with a social 
group indicate the embeddedness score and the degree of cohesion. 
When examining a social network, it is possible that we get different ‘branches’ in the 
network as we decompose it through cohesive blocking. The organisations that hold together 
these distinct groups are called bridge organisations, and they are also important in 
understanding the flow of resources in a network through strategically connected banks. We 
also show which banks act as bridges. 
 
FINDINGS 
The ECM networks we present show the roles and connections of investment banks in each 
location, which banks are in the core groups (i.e., the most deeply embedded banks with 
greater access to resources and deals in that network) and periphery groups, and their relative 
importance within that industry network. These signify their power in shaping the structure of 
ECM deals, appointment of ABS firms, allocation of fees, and access to potential investors. 
We find considerable variation in the structure of financial networks in Japan, Hong Kong, 
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and Singapore. The Japanese case, as predicted, reveals a financial network where almost all 
power is concentrated in Japanese megabanks and bulge-brackets. Hong Kong presents a 
sharp contrast to Japan, as the distribution of power in the network is much more 
heterogeneous. In Singapore, we find a network where Singaporean banks with significant 
activities in the surrounding region occupy powerful positions alongside bulge-brackets. 
These results are aligned with our initial expectations. However, they also reveal other 
important actors and relationships in the ECM networks of key Asian IFCs.  
The ECM networks in Japan (Figure 1) are unusual because there are only two levels 
with a 13-member clique at the core. Two types of financial intermediaries form this core 
group: bulge-bracket banks and Japanese megabanks. Bulge-bracket banks such as Goldman 
Sachs, Barclays, J.P. Morgan, and Deutsche Bank—North American and European 
powerhouses—are densely connected to Japanese megabanks. Every firm in the 13-member 
clique is as central as the other firms because all firms are connected to each other. However, 
there are some marked differences in the identities of bookrunners in different types of deals.8 
Bulge-bracket firms tend to be listed as bookrunners in deals oriented toward international 
investors and they are often featured as global co-ordinators. Japanese banks tend to be sole 
bookrunner in deals oriented toward the domestic market. These findings confirm our 
expectations as the dominance of Japanese mega-banks across capital markets, corporate 
finance and retail banking creates significant barriers to entry for foreign banks. As banks 
like Mitsubishi UFJ, Mizuho and Sumitomo Mitsui command an overwhelming share of the 
Japanese market, this industry landscape presents opportunities for only the largest bulge-
bracket banks who could leverage on their global distribution networks to capture ECM deals 
oriented towards international markets (Interviews: JP1, JP5, JP7, September 2016). 
																																								 																				
8 Dealogic database provides extensive details on deal characteristics, which we use in interpreting the network 
analysis results. 
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Figure 1: Cohesive blocks of bookrunners in Japan, 2013-15 
0 (k: 0)
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Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group
Okasan Securities Group
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Macquarie Group
Bank of America Merrill Lynch
Toyo Securities
Tokai Tokyo Financial Holdings
Deutsche Bank
BTG Pactual
Sawada Holdings
SBI Holdings
Nomura
Bridge Bookrunner
Non-Bridge Bookrunner
Tie to Bridge Bookrunner
Tie to Non-Bridge Bookrunner
Japan (2013-2015)
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Table 1: ECM transactions in Singapore, Hong Kong and Japan, 2013-2015 
Measure	 Hong	Kong	 Japan	 Singapore	
Number	of	deals	 1683	 777	 275	
Number	of	bookrunners	 221	 22	 68	
Number	of	ties	 1314	 78	 121	
Average	number	of	
bookrunners	per	deal	 1.69	(1.94)	 1.5	(1.26)	 1.49	(0.9)	
Maximum	number	of	
bookrunners	per	deal	 22	 13	 6	
Density	 0.054	 0.33	 0.053	
Transitivity	(clustering	
coefficient)	 0.61	 1	 0.51	
Note:	Numbers	in	parentheses	are	standard	deviations.			
Source:	Authors’	calculations	based	on	Dealogic	data.	
		
 
Perhaps the strongest evidence of the level of consolidation in Japanese ECM 
networks is the classic core-periphery pattern. As suggested in the introduction, clear core-
periphery patterns are rare in real-world social networks. They arise only when there is 
polarisation between a group that controls all flows and peripheral actors that are dependent 
on the core group for access to resources and flows in the network. That is precisely what we 
find in Japan. A handful of Japanese megabanks and bulge-bracket banks monopolize almost 
all the major IPO and follow-on deals, and smaller banks have a presence in this market 
solely through transactions that involve small and medium-scale enterprises. Density and 
transitivity measures offer further evidence of the concentration of power in Japanese mega-
banks and select bulge-bracket banks (Table 1). The Japanese ECM financial network is 
perfectly clustered with a level of density (0.33) much higher than Hong Kong and 
Singapore, which reflects a much higher number of mutual connections among banks inside 
the core group compared with other banks in the ECM network. Given that the number of 
bookrunners in Japan is far fewer than in Hong Kong and Singapore, despite the relatively 
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high number of deals brokered in Japan, these findings further accentuate the high 
concentration of power in Japanese mega-banks and selected global bulge-bracket banks.  
As the largest equity market in Asia, the cohesive blocks for Hong Kong are much 
more complex in terms of embeddedness levels and number of banks involved (Figure 2a). 
Multiple layers of embeddedness coupled with a dense core in Hong Kong indicate 
centralisation by the bookrunners at the core of the ECM network, despite significant activity 
captured by actors that lie outside the core. Most bulge-bracket firms have long business 
history in Hong Kong and feature very prominently in the ECM market, accounting for 
78.44% of total deal value.9 However, a different picture emerges when we analyse network 
ties and structure, with Hong Kong and mainland Chinese investment banks occupying 
significant positions in the industry network. The inner core layers in Figure 2b contain a 
surprisingly large number of Hong Kong and mainland Chinese firms alongside bulge-
bracket banks. Moreover, many of these firms play significant roles as bridge bookrunners. 
These Chinese firms, such as Emperor Capital Group and GF Securities, are vital in 
connecting a vibrant periphery of bookrunners (levels 2, 3, 4, and 5) to the core groups. 
Compared to Japan, the industry network in Hong Kong has a more diverse array of financial 
intermediaries and greater differentiation in the network structure. The deep capital markets 
in Hong Kong, strong legal and regulatory frameworks, and access to a wide pool of 
investors have made Hong Kong particularly attractive for mainland Chinese companies 
seeking IPOs and secondary listings. While this presents valuable opportunities for global 
bulge-bracket banks with their expertise and international distribution networks (interviews: 
HK5, HK6, July 2016), there are also multiple factors that mitigate the power of bulge-
brackets. The characteristics of many Chinese companies, especially state-owned enterprises 
that are encouraged to list overseas as ‘national champions’ (Lai, 2012; Wojcik & Camilleri, 
																																								 																				
9 All calculations are based on Dealogic ECM data. 
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2015), lead to a preference for local Hong Kong or Chinese financial intermediaries due to 
lower fees, language, business culture, and regulatory requirements on the mainland 
(interviews: CN5, CN6 CN9, July-August 2016). This could explain the diverse range of 
industry players. Thus, bulge-bracket banks, large established Hong Kong banks, and 
Chinese securities firms appeal to different types of clients and equity issues.  
 
 
Figure 2a: Cohesive blocks of bookrunners in Hong Kong, 2013-15 
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Figure 2b: Core of bookrunner networks in Hong Kong, 2013-15 
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Table 2: Weighted betweenness centrality rankings, Hong Kong and Singapore, 2013-2015 
	
Rank	 Hong	Kong	 Singapore	
1	 Huatai	Securities	 DBS	
2	 Industrial	Securities	 HSBC	
3	 China	Merchants	Bank	 Citi	
4	 Quam	Securities	 UBS	
5	 Emperor	Capital	Group	 Standard	Chartered	Bank	
6	 VMS	Investment	Group	 Credit	Suisse	
7	 Haitong	Securities	 CIMB	Group	
8	 GF	Securities	Co	 Goldman	Sachs	
9	 Guotai	Junan	Securities	 UOB	
10	 BNP	Paribas	 RHB	Capital	
Note:	Betweenness	centrality	as	weighted	by	deal	value.	The	figures	for	Japan	are	not	
reported	as	betweenness	centrality	contains	little	information	for	the	case	of	a	clique.	
Source:	Authors’	calculations	based	on	Dealogic	data	
	
	
The weighted betweenness centrality measures in Table 2 provide further evidence of 
the prominence of local and Chinese financial intermediaries.10 The top 10 firms are almost 
all Hong Kong or Chinese investment banks, which signal their more powerful positions in 
ECM networks with rich information and financial resources, ability to generate stronger 
demand and reduce uncertainty around equity issues, and influence other underwriters. We 
expected some of the largest Chinese investment banks to be important in ECM networks 
since large volumes of ECM activities in Hong Kong are generated by Chinese firms (with 
domestic listings accounting for almost 95% of the Hong Kong Exchange). However, their 
prominence and the number of banks identified have exceeded our expectations. As the 
capital needs of mainland Chinese firms continue to grow with domestic and overseas 
																																								 																				
10 The figures for Japan are not reported as the core group is a clique, meaning every bookrunner is connected to 
every other bookrunner. Hence, every bookrunner is as central as other bookrunners in the clique, even when 
transaction values are taken into account. For mathematical details, please see Wasserman & Faust (1994). 
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expansion, this could mean increasingly important roles for local and regional banks in Hong 
Kong’s ECM network and a potential challenge to the roles of North American and European 
bulge-bracket banks in Hong Kong. 
 
 
Figure 3: Cohesive blocks of bookrunners in Singapore, 2013-15 
 
 
We observe a less differentiated financial network in Singapore (Figure 3). The inner 
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equity networks is unsurprising given that they account for 77.74% of all ECM deals (by 
value). However, Singaporean and Malaysian banks (e.g., DBS, OCBC, and CIMB) are also 
significant in the inner block. This is also reflected in betweenness centrality rankings with 
these banks strongly represented and DBS topping the list (Table 2). The important positions 
of both bulge-bracket and local banks can be traced to the evolution of Singapore’s banking 
sector since the banking reforms of 1999-2004. The banking liberalisation measures 
increased participation of foreign banks in Singapore and led to growing sophistication in 
investment banking activities. At the same time, competitive pressures pushed local banks 
into seeking M&As to enlarge their capital base, and seek other revenue streams in capital 
market activities rather than traditional loans and trade finance (Lai & Daniels, 2017). Given 
the relatively small domestic ECM market (having 63% domestic listings, compared with 
99% in Japan and 94% in Hong Kong), regional opportunities presented by growing 
economies in the region, such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam and India, become 
particularly important in shaping firm strategies. This led to aggressive regional expansion 
and hiring sprees by Singaporean and Malaysian banks in recent years (interviews: SG2, 
SG4, SG8, June-July 2016). Earlier banking reforms and the regional economic environment 
thus explains the central positions of local banks in Singapore’s ECM network, even if they 
do not dominate the industry in terms of deal value.  
In terms of overall industry structure, we find the greatest concentration of power in 
Japan, followed by Singapore, with Hong Kong having the most heterogeneous structure and 
competitive industry in comparison. The concentration of ECM transactions among a small 
number of investment banks in Japan reflects the historical legacy of banking regulation and 
the power of Japanese mega-banks. With a limited domestic market in Singapore, the 
growing Southeast Asian market is vital for investment banking activities and helps explain 
the prominent positions of Singaporean and Malaysia banks in such networks. Although the 
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Hong Kong market has strong domestic orientation, the sheer size of the ECM sector and the 
liberalised banking environment enabled a wide range of investment banks to capitalise on 
different firm characteristics (e.g., bulge-bracket or boutique banks, specific industry 
specialisation, domestic or globally oriented) to develop different market niches and survive 
in a highly competitive environment.  
Global bulge-bracket banks are prominent in the ECM networks of all three 
economies, accounting for 76-78% of ECM deal value in Singapore and Hong Kong, and 
63% even in Japan where large domestic players are powerful. However, our analysis of 
structural embeddedness and centralisation reveals the importance of local and regional 
investment banks, with different types of banks in positions of power and centrality in each 
location. In general, bulge-bracket banks from North America and Europe dominate the ECM 
segment in terms of total deal value, especially for deals that involve cross-border listings or 
targeted at international investors. However, analysing ECMs based on network structures 
reveal different patterns of centrality and embeddedness, which in turn indicates considerable 
variation in the distribution of power among different investment banks. The developmental 
trajectories and regional context of the leading Asian IFCs shed light on the observed 
distribution of power among different investment banks. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Investment banks are widely seen as highly globalised institutions, with bulge-bracket banks 
(mostly from the USA and Europe) seen as key actors in facilitating flows of capital across 
borders. In this paper, we have examined whether their financial networks within IFCs follow 
similar patterns in terms of how power is distributed among different types of investment 
banks. Our findings show considerable variation in the distribution of power and structure of 
investment banking networks within IFCs. In Singapore, we find bulge-bracket as well as 
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many Singaporean and Malaysian investment banks at the most powerful positions in 
financial networks, as the result of the latter’s aggressive expansion into regional markets in 
recent years. In Japan, domestic mega-banks dominate alongside a handful of prestigious 
bulge-bracket banks. In Hong Kong, bulge-bracket firms are well established but a 
surprisingly large number of Chinese investment banks prove to be powerful in underwriter 
networks, especially as bridge bookrunners in connecting different firms. We have shown 
that the distribution of power among different banks in different IFCs—measured through 
positions in cohesive blocks—aligns with theoretical expectations regarding the important 
role of developmental trajectories and regional context in shaping the structure of financial 
networks in IFCs. While our empirical findings are based on the 2013-2015 period, analysis 
for longer and shorter periods (2012-2015 and 2014-2015) also yield similar results, which 
shows that findings in this paper are fairly robust. That being said, our analysis is static in 
that we do not study change over time in these financial networks. Such financial networks 
are highly dynamic and the examination of how they change over time stands as an important 
and largely unexplored area of research, particularly for rapidly growing economies in Asia. 
We hope that the analysis in this paper paves the way for further longitudinal investigation. 
Our key findings highlight the importance of local trajectories and regional dynamics 
in shaping industry structures. They also point to increasingly powerful roles for local and 
regional investment banks in Asia, which could have future implications for organisational 
strategies and industry networks of investment banks (Knight & Wójcik, 2017). For local and 
national authorities, such findings based on network structures underline the importance of 
network positions (rather than just firm size or deal value) in assessing the roles and influence 
of different types of investment banks (in terms of access to information, resources and 
partnerships). Such an analysis could also be applied to other advanced business services, 
which are key business partners of investment banks, in understanding cities as ‘strategic 
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places’ in the global economy (Taylor et al., 2014). Strategic cities are not only sites through 
which finance and ABS firms perform their roles as global network makers, they constitute 
vital nodes where these firms have to be, in order to tap into the right mix of capital, 
knowledge, markets and network opportunities. As such, our findings further develop Taylor 
et al.’s (2014) arguments regarding the variegated ‘strategicness’of cities as different 
financial centres present varied opportunities to investment banks, due to local industry 
network structures, historical contexts, regulatory changes and regional characteristics. This 
paper therefore goes beyond analysing IFCs in terms of networks between these nodes (which 
has been well established in world city network studies) to show how relationships within 
IFCs can reveal richer insights into the work of investment banks and positioning IFCs as 
differentiated markets (Lai, 2012).  
Recent work by urban and financial geographers have noted the rising importance of 
Asia in world city networks and investment banking activities (Derudder & Taylor, 2016; 
Wojcik et al., 2018). Through the ECM networks of investment banks within these IFCs, our 
analysis extend those broad observations and present evidence of differentiated financial hubs 
in Asia. The theoretical perspective and empirical techniques we have adopted in this paper 
reveal that the seemingly global nature of investment banking hides a complex interplay 
between the global and the local, and that further research on financial networks within IFCs 
is necessary to understand the dynamic and variegated landscapes of global finance.   
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APPENDIX  
DATA CONSTRUCTION PROCEDURE 
Our social network data are based on the raw transactions in the Dealogic database. The 
financial intermediaries who broker a deal as a sole bookrunner appear as isolated nodes in 
our analysis and a tie represents firms who jointly broker a deal. When financial 
intermediaries occupy a role as a bookrunner, lead manager, or global co-ordinator in the 
same transaction (see Figure A1a), this implies that the firms interact for an extended period 
of time in financing, exchanging information, and gathering interested investors to finalise a 
transaction. A deal with multiple financial intermediaries who act as bookrunner, lead-
manager, or global co-ordinator will be represented by multiple ties among the different 
intermediaries. We use this information to build the accompanying adjacency matrix (see 
Figure A1b) where a 1 in a cell indicates the presence of a tie. Empty cells indicate the 
absence of a tie. Taken together, the adjacency matrix (or socio-matrix) represents the 
distribution of ties among financial organizations. Figure A1c illustrates the social network 
built from the pattern of transactions in Figure A1a. 
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Figure A1: Social network analysis    
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COHESIVE BLOCKING 
In what follows, we assume an undirected and simple graph G, which consists of the set V of 
vertices and set E of edges. In the case of social network analysis, vertices are actors and 
edges are relations between the actors in the network. The set E of edges consists of 
unordered pairs of distinct vertices. The order of a graph G is defined as the number of 
vertices in of G. If G is of order 1, it is called a trivial graph. We do not consider empty 
graphs. A path in G is a sequence of vertices and edges where all vertices and edges are 
distinct. G is connected if there is a path between all distinct vertices; it is disconnected 
otherwise. For instance, the graph in Figure A2 is disconnected, since there is no path 
connecting nodes P and B. If G is disconnected and if it is not a trivial graph, its components 
consist of the set of nodes that can be connected by a path (Diestel, 2005; Harary, 1969; 
Wasserman & Faust 1994). The graph in Figure A2 has two components: {P, R, S} and {A, 
B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, X, Y, Z}.  
 
Figure A2: Cohesive blocking procedure 
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Cohesive blocking is a social network analysis technique combining two key notions 
in sociological theory: social cohesion and embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985; Moody & 
White, 2003). The technique rests on the notion of k-connectivity, which is defined as the 
minimum number of vertices that should be removed to make a graph disconnected or trivial 
(Harary, 1969, pp. 45-46). For instance, the component consisting of vertices {P, R, S} and 
the edges {(P,R), (P,S), (R,S)} will result in a trivial graph if any two of its vertices are 
removed. Thus, this particular component is said to be 2-connected (k = 2). In general, a k-
component is any component of a non-trivial graph G that will be disconnected after the 
removal of k nodes. 
The graph-theoretic notion of connectivity provides a solid basis for measuring social 
cohesion thanks to Menger’s theorem. Menger’s theorem states that the k-connectivity of a 
graph is equivalent to the number of disjoint paths connecting any two vertices in the graph 
(Harary, 1969, p. 47). This famous theorem is applicable to understanding social networks as 
it states that the structural cohesion of a social network is equivalent to the distinct relations 
that hold a network together (Moody & White 2003, p. 109). 
Furthermore, the notion of k-connectivity can be employed to examine levels of 
embeddedness in a social network because of the recursive nature of k-connectivity. Each k-
component in a graph G may contain components at the same or different levels of k-
connectivity. For instance, the graph illustrated in Figure A2 has four levels of 
embeddedness. The first level consists of all the nodes in the network and has k equal to 0 as 
the graph is disconnected. In the second level, this graph has two components, one of which 
is 1-connected and the other is 2-connected. In the third level, the 1-connected component of 
level 2 features three components, which are 4-, 2-, and 2-connected. Finally, in the fourth 
level of embeddedness, we have the component {G, H, I, J}, which 3-connected. 
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Moody & White (2003) develop a recursive algorithm to identify the different levels 
of embeddedness in a network. Their algorithm builds on Kanevsky (1993), who combines 
Even-Tarjan reduction (Even & Tarjan, 1975; Even 2012) with Provan-Shier paradigm 
(Provan & Shier, 1996) for listing all minimum (s,t)-cutsets to generate all minimum-size 
separating vertex sets. In this paper, we follow Moody & White (2003) algorithm as 
implemented in the graph analysis software package igraph (Csárdi & Nepusz, 2006). Our 
implementation slightly diverges from the igraph package, and the particular algorithm we 
implement are available as pseudocode or as C-language source from the authors upon 
request. As the algorithm is highly technical, we refer the interested reader to the publications 
listed above, in particular, Moody & White (2003) and Kanevsky (1993). 
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